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Abstract: Metaphor, or translatio, is one of the most prominent figures in classical and medieval rhetoric, and the 
late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries inherited both a sense of its importance, and a complex admixture of 
attitudes about its cognitive and linguistic functions. This was enabled by the teaching of imitatio (μίμησις), ‘the 
study and conspicuous deployment of features recognizably characteristic of a canonical author's style or 
content…’, which emphasised intimate knowledge of as large as possible a library of texts. 1  
The close analysis involved necessitated memorising and internalising a wide variety of authorial models, 
which makes Renaissance authors ideal for a historical examination of one of the key tenets of an influential 
modern theory: that metaphor is fundamental to cognition. In this paper I survey some sixteenth-century uses as 
a metaphor of the mirror for counsel, against the background of Lakoff and Johnson’s ‘invariance principle’. 
 
The mirror was a metaphor for many things at once in sixteenth-century literature: in 
John Lyly’s 1591 play Endimion the mirror is associated with Vanitas, Superba, Luxuria, 
Veritas, Prudentia, and Contemplation.2 Recent work on vision metaphors in European 
literature details the centrality of the mirror as a metaphor in the Renaissance.3 At the 
                                                        
1 Gian Biagio Conte and Glenn W. Most, ‘Imitatio’, in Oxford Classical Dictionary 
<10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.013.3266> [accessed 25 October 2016]. 
2 Robert S. Knapp, ‘The Monarchy of Love in Lyly's “Endimion”’, Modern Philology, 73 (1976), 353-67 
(p. 363–5). 
3 For example, Suzanne Conklin Akbari, Seeing Through the Veil: Optical Theory and and Medieval Allegory 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012); Rayna Kalas, Frame, Glass, Verse: The Technology of Poetic 
Invention in the English Renaissance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); The Mirror in Medieval and 
Early Modern Culture: Specular Reflections, ed. by Nancy M. Frelick (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016).  
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same time as improvements in crystal glass technology allowed for ever clearer and 
more frequent self-regard, mirrors were seen as spiritually and psychologically 
distorting.4 But this was not necessarily a bad thing. The mirror metaphor was not 
only an established topic for political criticism and self-reflection (as it is now called: 
a case in point), but also for the juxtaposition of ideals and realities and dialogue 
between them. The loci classici of the mirror metaphor can be seen in the mirror of St 
Paul, through which we see divine perfection ‘in aenigmate’, and the mirror of 
Narcissus, symbol of vain (in both senses), and ultimately fatal, self-regard.5 Both of 
these traditions reflect Platonic doctrines of ideal forms of knowledge.6 This study 
examines how the mirror of St Paul and the mirror of Narcissus worked together in 
sixteenth-century counsel. 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argued in Metaphors We Live By that 
metaphor is central to cognition: we think by mapping metaphors from one domain 
of experience to another.7 For example we speak, and think, of cognition in terms of 
vision, as people did in the sixteenth century (speculation, reflection, perception).8 As 
vision requires a degree of illumination, a viewer, an object, and an eye or lens, these 
                                                        
4 For example, Sabine Melchior-Bonnet, The Mirror: A History, trans. by Katherine H. Jewett (London: 
Routledge, 2001) and Mark Pendergrast, Mirror Mirror: A History of the Human Love Affair with Reflection 
(New York: Basic Books, 2003). 
5 Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem. Nunc cognosco ex parte: tunc autem 
cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum: ‘For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know 
in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.’ I Cor. 13.12. 
6 Anna Torti, The Glass of Form: Mirroring Structures from Chaucer to Skelton (Rochester, NY: Brewer, 
1991), pp. 6, 9–10. 
7 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 
pp. 3–4. 
8 See for example; John Florio, A Worlde of Wordes, Or Most copious, and exact Dictionarie in Italian and 
English (London: Edward Blount, 1598), STC 11098; John Baret, An aluearie or triple dictionarie, in 
Englishe, Latin, and French (London: Denham, 1574), p. 234; and see Nancy M. Frelick, The Mirror in 
Medieval and Early Modern Culture, pp. 3, 7–10, 11–12; Akbari, Seeing Through the Veil, pp. 6–7. 
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elements are mapped on to intellection: we understand something ‘dimly’ or ‘clearly’, 
the person attempting to understand is the viewer, the topic to be understood is the 
object, and the means of understanding (sometimes the mind, sometimes the theory 
or medium) is the lens. While such ‘conceptual metaphors’ are not universal, once 
such a metaphor is established, it tends to persist.9 New ideas, and indeed new 
metaphors, are mapped on to the sum total of previously existing meanings. To 
explain how this happens, Lakoff and Johnson proposed the invariance principle: 
 
Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema 
structure) of the source domain [in this case vision], in a way consistent with the 
inherent structure of the target domain [intellection].10  
 
While cognitive linguistics has advanced since the early 1980s, the invariance 
principle remains an influential idea in the discipline.11 With the influence of the 
linguistic turn on historiography, a renewed interest in metaphor among historians is 
shown in several recent studies, such as Judith H. Anderson’s study of three 
                                                        
9 For example, some societies conceive of time as a circle, others as linear. 
10 George Lakoff, ‘Conceptual Metaphor’, in Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Readings, ed. by Dirk Geeraerts 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006), 185–238 (p. 199). First published as ‘Contemporary Theory of Metaphor’, in 
Metaphor and Thought, ed. by Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 202-251 
(p. 215). 
11 Cognitive linguistics, including conceptual metaphor theory, has been developed mainly in 
linguistics with the perspectives of philosophy, psychology, and the social sciences. Conceptual 
metaphor theory and more broadly cognitive metaphor theory is therefore situated in this context. 
Subsequently cognitive metaphor theory has been applied to the study of literature and the 
development of cognitive poetics. See Gerard Steen, ‘The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor—Now 
New and Improved!’, Review of Cognitive Linguistics, 9 (2011), 26–64;  George Lakoff and Mark Turner, 
More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1989); Mark Turner, Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991); Peter Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction (Abingdon: 
Psychology Press, 2002). 
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metaphors in the English Reformation, Translating Investments.12 In extrapolating the 
theories of metaphor in the Renaissance, scholars have taken issue with cognitive 
linguistics’ universalising premise.13 One way to address this issue is to simply avoid 
applying modern theories to early modern material on grounds of anachronism. This 
may be one reason why cognitive metaphor theory, despite its universalising goal, has 
not so far been historicised. In this article, I would like to explore some similarities 
and differences between Renaissance theories of metaphor and cognitive metaphor 
theory. Although cognitive metaphor theory has of course developed and broadened 
beyond Lakoff’s initial text, this article focuses on the invariance principle as an 
important tenet of that theory, comparing the invariance principle to the treatment of 
metaphor in Renaissance rhetoric. I will examine how this conceptual resemblance 
was used in the idea of counsel as a mirror for princes (and other individuals), and for 
Elizabethan society more broadly. For Aristotle, just as for Lakoff and Johnson, the 
creation of meaning through metaphor is a universal human capacity and a universal 
human pleasure: 
 
                                                        
12 Judith H. Anderson, Translating Investments. Metaphor and the Dynamic of Cultural Change in Tudor-
Stuart England (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). 
13 Judith Anderson finds Lakoff and Johnson’s theory ‘lacking a historico-cultural dimension’ 
(Translating Investments, pp. 183, 212 n. 110). Similarly, Miranda Anderson finds that ‘Both evolutionary 
psychology and cognitive linguistics literary approaches tend to operate without due attention to the 
historical (and geographical) variables also involved in literary and linguistic constructions’ (Miranda 
Anderson, The Renaissance Extended Mind (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 63), and in 
particular ‘Lakoff and Johnson’s concept of language has overly universalising and homogenising 
tendencies’ (p. 25). Raphael Lyne’s work finds cognitive metaphor theory useful for early modern 
literature: see for example Shakespeare, Rhetoric and Cognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011) and Memory and Intertextuality in Renaissance Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2016). I would suggest that any attempt to describe a cognitive and/or linguistic phenomenon (such as 
metaphor) that is assumed to be universal, requires the explanation to be applicable across times and 
places. If so, an attempt to apply it therefore constitutes a useful litmus test for such a theory. 
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metaphor especially has clarity and sweetness and strangeness [... A]ll people carry on 
their conversations with metaphors [...]  for people are admirers of what is far off, and 
what is marvellous is sweet.14 
 
This passage also introduces the idea that ‘clarity and sweetness and strangeness’ are 
not mutually exclusive qualities; the appeal of the ‘marvellous’ and the clarity of the 
familiar work together in metaphor. Mark Turner credits Aristotle with something 
like a proto-invariance principle, citing ‘Aristotle’s apparent characterization of [...] 
metaphor as the perception of similarity in dissimilar things’.15 Aristotle originally 
noticed that a metaphor is constrained not to violate various things about the target. 
He expressed this by saying that the source must fit the target in certain ways, 
including what appear to be conceptual ways.16 For Cicero, although ‘metaphors were 
first established because of a shortage of words’, metaphorical expression ‘clarifie[s a] 
resemblance between this thing and the thing that we evoke by [...] the metaphorical 
word [...] Other metaphors [...] introduce some splendour [...]’ (my emphasis). This 
appeal leads to common usage, where metaphors ‘c[o]me to be used frequently 
because of their charm’.17  
In Institutiones Oratoriae, Quintilian classifies metaphor as:  
                                                        
14 Aristotle, On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse, ed. and trans. by George A. Kennedy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), III. 1404b–1405a, pp. 221–23. The translation and comparison of 
metaphorical idioms (sputare il rospo, for example) is a common human pleasure that illustrates the 
point. 
15 Turner, p. 55. Cf. Aristotle, ‘the right use of metaphor means an eye for resemblances’ (Poetics 1459a) 
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0056%3Asection%3
D1459a#note1> [accessed 30/10/16.]). 
16 Turner, pp. 54–5, paraphrasing Aristotle, Rhetoric 1405a. 
17 Cicero, On the Ideal Orator, trans. by James M. May and Jakob Wisse (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2001), III, 155–7, p. 270. 




A noun or a verb is transferred from the place to which it properly belongs to another 
where there is either no literal term or the transferred is better than the literal. We do 
this either because it is necessary or to make our meaning clearer or, as I have already 
said, to produce a decorative effect. When it secures none of these results, our 
metaphor will be out of place.18 
 
Thus, for Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, three of the major influences on 
Renaissance rhetoric, metaphor adds clarity, significance and/or charm through 
interdependent resemblance and difference between the two terms. While metaphors 
foreground ‘resemblance’ between one thing and another (in modern terms, between 
source and target), it is the distance between them that confers splendour and 
therefore creates new meaning — provided there is sufficient existing resemblance to 
be recognisable and sufficient distance to strike the imagination. Lakoff defined this 
resemblance as ‘topologically consistent image-schemata’, as in the vision-intellection 
metaphor.19 Any new metaphorical transference must clarify or reinforce some aspect 
of the source at the same time as it clarifies some aspect of the target. In this, Lakoff’s 
invariance principle echoes classical metaphor theory. 
These ideas remained current throughout the sixteenth century, as can be seen 
in English rhetorical textbooks that translated and engaged with the classical sources. 
For Thomas Wilson, Henry Peacham and George Puttenham, as for Aristotle, Cicero 
                                                        
18 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, ed. by William P. Thayer, trans. by H. E. Butler, 8.6.4–6 
<http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Quintilian/Institutio_Oratoria/8B*.html#
6.4> [accessed 15 December 2017.] 
19 Cf. Lakoff, ‘Conceptual Metaphor’, p. 199. 
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and Quintilian, metaphor works by transferring meaning from a ‘natural’ to an 
‘unnatural’ domain, but this is only possible because of some [existing and 
recognisable] ‘likeness’, ‘nearness’ or ‘affinity’. Metaphor is: 
 
an alteration [...] from the proper and natural meaning to that which is not proper and 
yet agreeth thereunto by some likeness that appeareth to be in it.20 
 
[...] from the proper signification, to another not proper, but yet nigh and like.21  
 
a kind of wresting [...] from his owne right signification, to another not so naturall, but 
yet of some affinitie or conueniencie with it.22  
 
This sense of a proper signification and one ‘like’ it, appear cognate with Lakoff’s 
source and target domains.  
However, where no such resemblance seems to exist, the figure is called not 
metaphor but catachresis, ‘abuse’. For Peacham, this is a ‘necessary abuse of like 
words’ where no ‘proper’ term exists (my emphasis).23 Puttenham omits ‘necessary’, 
and indeed the lack of necessity is the reason he calls it abuse.24  Erasmus echoes the 
sense of necessary impropriety: a word used metaphorically ‘is transferred away from 
                                                        
20 Thomas Wilson, The Art of Rhetoric, for the Use of All Such as Are Studious of Eloquence, ed. by Nicholas 
Sharp (1553), book III <http://www.people.vcu.edu/~nsharp/wilsded2.htm> [accessed 12/7/2016]. 
Printed in 1553, 1560, 1562, 1563, 1567, 1580, 1584, and 1585. 
21 Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (1593) (Delmar, New York: Scholars' Facsimiles & 
Reprints, 1977) 
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.03.0082%3Apart%3DTr
opes+of+words> [accessed 22 October 2016]. Printed in 1577, 1591, and 1593. 
22 George Puttenham, Arte of English Poesie, 3.17 <http://ota.ox.ac.uk/text/3181.html> [accessed 22 
October 2016]. Printed in 1589 and 1590. 
23 Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (London: H. Jackson, 1577), STC / 348:04, sig. C4r. 
24 ‘without any iust inconuenience’: Puttenham, 3.17.  
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its real and proper signification to one which lies outside’.25 In Angel Day’s English 
Secretary, the same distinction, and the same similarity, is made between metaphor 
and catachresis. Metaphor is the transference of a word ‘from the proper or right 
signification […] to another neere unto the meaning’, and catachresis ‘where wee 
accommodate a name to a thing that is not proper’.26 Judith Anderson notes the 
occasional conflation of metaphor and catachresis in early modern rhetoric, and 
suggests that the difference seems to be in degree of ‘nearness’ to the ‘proper natural 
signification’.27  
Lakoff and Johnson refute what they call the ‘Naming Position’: ‘that a 
metaphor is the use of a word to mean something it doesn’t “properly” mean’, because 
‘the position has the false consequence that metaphor has no conceptual role. In other 
words, it cannot be used in reasoning, conceptualizing, and understanding’.28 
However, subscribing to this position did not hinder Renaissance authors from using 
metaphor to reason, conceptualise, and understand. ‘In cases of indeterminate target 
structure’, Mark Turner allows: 
  
the metaphor has exceptionally wide power to impart meaning to the subject [...] by 
imparting to it through metaphor the image-schematic structure of a source. Much of 
                                                        
25 Erasmus, Copia: Foundations of the Abundant Style, trans. by Betty I. Knott, ed. by Craig R. Thompson, 
vol. 24 in Collected Works of Erasmus (University of Toronto Press, 1974– ), (hereafter CWE), p. 333. 
26 Angel Day, The English Secretary (London: Printed by P[eter]. S[hort]. for C. Burbie, 1599). pp. 77–9. 
<https://archive.org/details/englishsecretary00daya> [accessed 24 October 2016]. Printed in 1586, 
1592, and 1595. 
27 Judith Anderson, Translating Investments, pp. 129–65. See especially pp. 135–7 and p. 145. 
28 Lakoff and Johnson, p. 124. 
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our abstract reasoning may or may not be a metaphoric version of image-schematic 
reasoning.29  
 
As Lakoff and Johnson put it:  
 
To the extent that we use a conceptual [...] metaphor, we accept its validity. 
Consequently, when someone else uses it, we are predisposed to accept its validity. 
For this reason, conventionalised schemas and metaphors have persuasive power.30  
 
In this, Lakoff and Johnson’s explanation of metaphor’s appeal seems to echo 
Wilson’s: 
 
Thus as necessitye hath forced us to borowe wordes translated: so hath time and 
practice made theim to seeme moost pleasaunt, and therfore thei are muche the rather 
used.31  
 
It is worth noting here that Wilson and his contemporaries were very conscious that 
translatio is the literal Latin translation for the Greek word ‘metaphor’, and in the 
sixteenth century ‘translation’ was a common way of referring to metaphor, the 
‘carrying over’ of meaning from one referent to another. Here Wilson, Lakoff and 
Johnson describe the appeal, and centrality to cognition, of metaphors as they become 
familiar through usage. 
                                                        
29 Turner, p. 61. 
30 Lakoff and Johnson, p. 63. 
31 Wilson, p. z3r < http://ota.ox.ac.uk/text/3153.html> [accessed 25 October 2016]. 
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However, Aristotle’s ‘strangeness’ was also an important part of metaphor’s 
appeal and power. This aspect was much more heavily emphasised in the Renaissance 
schoolroom, which trained writers for public and professional life, than in modern 
linguistics. Students were urged to become familiar with a wide variety of models so 
as to be able to coin new usages that would be strange enough to give splendour, but 
‘yet of some affinitie’.32 I would argue that metaphorical ‘abuse’ was found necessary 
in the Elizabethan period less for lack of words — there are many ways to neologise; 
for example loan words, calques and backformations were common — than because 
sufficient distance between image-schemata was needed for the metaphor to appeal 
to the imagination. As Peacham cautions ‘that the similitude be not greater then the 
matter requireth, or contrariwise lesse’ (my emphasis).33  
The key to developing this skill, and to developing this affinity, was imitatio, 
the imitation of canonical authors, in particular stylistic characteristics, such as 
metaphor. For Erasmus: 
 
not polish alone but all the dignity of language stems from its metaphors [...]. Of the 
other ornaments of style, each makes its own peculiar contribution to its charm and 
flexibility; metaphor alone adds everything in fuller measure [...].34 
 
                                                        
32 Puttenham, 3.17. 
33 Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence, sig. D4v  
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.03.0082%3Apart%3DTr
opes+of+words> [accessed 25 October 2016]. 
34 Erasmus, Parallels, trans. by R.A.B. Mynors and ed. by Craig R. Thompson, vol. 23 in CWE, p. 130. 
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Therefore, metaphor was one way that conceptual frameworks were transferred (or 
as Shakespeare’s Bottom would say ‘translated’) from one author to another. 35 In De 
Copia, written for John Colet’s St Paul’s School, Erasmus exhorts the student to 
‘provide himself with extensive lists of striking metaphors culled from the best 
authors [...], These I myself have laboured to collect’.36  
Erasmus’ Parabolae, or Parallels, are a collection of metaphors taken from Greek 
and Latin authors for the embellishment of writing exercises and letters. In the preface 
to this text, Erasmus hinted: ‘It will not be found out of the way to attach this book to 
my Adagia or, if so preferred, to my Copia as a kind of supplement’. 37 Both books were 
enormously popular throughout sixteenth-century Europe. It is easy to see why 
metaphor dominated Renaissance rhetoric.38 Perhaps not too surprisingly, then, it was 
also instrumental in early thinking about cognition: ‘For the Greek parabole, which 
Cicero latinizes as collatio, a sort of comparison, is nothing more than a metaphor writ 
large’.39 Comparing and being able to imitate many styles is a similar mental operation 
to that demanded in the comparison of different ‘strange’ yet ‘like’ qualities, or in 
Lakoff’s terms, image-schemata consistent with the topology of the target domain (in 
itself a metaphor: understanding as map-making).40 The way this comparison worked 
                                                        
35 A Midsummer Night’s Dream, III. i. 12–13. 
36 Erasmus, Copia, CWE, p. 335. 
37 Erasmus, Parallels, p. 134. 
38 Betty Knott, ‘Introduction’ in Copia, CWE, pp. 281–3. Knott comments: ‘De copia was before long 
adopted as a textbook of rhetoric in schools and universities throughout northern Europe; so 
widespread did its use become that it was worth pirating, summarizing, excerpting, turning into a 
question-and-answer manual, and making the subject of commentaries. Editions, both authorized and 
unauthorized, of the work in its various forms poured from the presses of Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Paris.’ She then lists the main editions. 
39 Erasmus, Parallels, p. 130. Raphael Lyne has explored this further, particularly in Shakespeare, Rhetoric 
and Cognition and Memory and Intertextuality in Renaissance Literature. 
40 Lakoff, p. 199. 
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in practice can be seen in the metaphor of the mirror, particularly in the way the mirror 
was used as a metaphor in Elizabethan notions of counsel, that is, the giving, 
receiving, and soliciting of advice. As we will see, counsel was based on the image-
schema of ‘the mind as possessing one or more figurative mirrors [...] no other model 
of the mind competed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with this 
paradigm’.41 
This image-schema of the mind as a mirror allowed for different kinds of 
mirrors. Erasmus’ Parabolae included references to the mirror as a reflection to be held 
up to an angry man (456B),42 an example (85B),43 and a ‘flatterer’ that ‘reproduces 
whatever is set before him’ (53A).44 Mirror was a ‘splendid’ (in this context, boastful), 
book title, like Summa or Jewel.45 In fact, as Herbert Grabes has shown, the mirror as a 
title denoted several recognised kinds of ‘splendour’ by the sixteenth century. Printed 
‘mirrors’ could be encyclopaedic, showing everything: fantastic, showing imaginary 
things; prophetic, showing things as they would be, or didactic, showing things as 
they should (or should not) be.46 Some of the earliest texts called mirrors were 
encyclopaedias and compendia, such as Vincent of Beauvais’ thirteenth-century 
Speculum maius, a monumental work setting out to describe the nature, doctrine, and 
history of the world. Conduct manuals such as, the mirror for princes that showed 
rulers models of right and wrong behaviour, were also popular throughout the 
                                                        
41 Maurice A. Hunt, Shakespeare's Speculative Art (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 15. 
42 Erasmus, Parallels, p. 199. 
43 Erasmus, Parallels, p. 188. 
44 Erasmus, Parallels, p. 144. 
45 Erasmus, Antibarbari, trans. by Margaret Mann Phillips, ed. by Craig R. Thompson, vol. 23 in CWE, 
p. 67. 
46 Herbert Grabes, The Mutable Glass: Mirror-Imagery in Titles and Texts of the Middle Ages and the English 
Renaissance, trans. by Gordon Collier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 39. 
Jenny Smith, ‘Necessary Abuse: The Mirror as Metaphor in the Sixteenth Century’ 
13 
 
medieval period. Throughout the sixteenth century, a text called a ‘mirror’ or ‘glass’ 
could be a conduct manual,47 biography,48 textbook,49 or social satire. These different 
literary functions and conventions were often combined and influenced one another, 
as the practice of imitatio helped to ensure. For example, in the Mirror for Magistrates 
(1559), biography functioned as a didactic mirror to those in office, as well as holding 
up an encyclopaedic, or all-encompassing, mirror to a changing society. 
In 1602, Sir Richard Hawkins, a sea captain and explorer who had commanded 
one of Queen Elizabeth’s ships against the Armada, wrote to the Queen, addressing 
her as a ‘Mirror for Princes and my dread Sovereign’.50 Elizabeth would have 
understood him to be invoking her as a mirror in the sense of a model or example, as 
Edmund Mather did when he addressed her as a ‘Mirror of Clemencie’.51 Elizabeth 
                                                        
47 Thomas Salter, A mirrhor mete for all mothers, matrones, and maidens, intituled the Mirrhor of Modestie no 
lesse profitable and pleasant, then necessarie to bee read and practiced (London: J. Kingston for Edward White, 
1579).  
48 Anthony Munday, Palmerin D'Oliua The mirrour of nobilitie, mappe of honor, anotamie of rare fortunes, 
heroycall president of Loue:... Presenting to noble mindes, theyr courtlie desire, to gentles, theyr choise 
expectations, and to the inferior sorte, howe to imitate theyr vertues... (London: I. Charlewood for William 
Wright, 1588). 
49 The mariners mirrour wherin may playnly be seen the courses, heights, distances, depths, soundings, flouds 
and ebs, risings of lands, rocks, sands and shoalds…. (London: John Charlewood, 1588). 
50 Richard Hawkins to The Queen, August 6, 1602. Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. the 
Marquis of Salisbury, Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire, ed. by R. A. Roberts. Vol. 12: 1602. 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1910), p. 285. 
<http://go.galegroup.com.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/mss/i.do?id=GALE|MC4306300653&v=2.1&u=u
nimelb&it=r&p=SPOL&sw=w&viewtype=Calendar> [accessed 24 October 2016]. 
51 Edmund Mather to the Queen, [Jan. 29.] [1571–2]. Edmund Mather, Submission. A Collection of State 
Papers, Relating to Affairs in the Reigns of King Henry VIII, King Edward VI, Queen Mary, and Queen 
Elizabeth, Transcribed from Original letters and Other Authentick Memorials, Left by William Cecill Lord 
Burghley, ed. by William Murdin. Vol. 2: 1571–1596. (London: William Bowyer, 1759), p. 207. 
<http://go.galegroup.com.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/mss/i.do?id=GALE|MC4304900160&v=2.1&u=u
nimelb&it=r&p=SPOL&sw=w&viewtype=Transcript> [accessed 24 October 2016]. Similarly, 
Holinshed calls Henry V a 'mirror of magnificence' (Raphael Holinshed, Holinshed's Chronicles: Richard 
II, 1398–1400: Henry IV and Henry V, ed. by Robert Strachan Wallace and Alma Hansen (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1923), p. 132) and Shakespeare calls him ‘mirror of all Christian kings’ (Henry V, II. 
Prologue. 6), noted in Hunt, p. 77. Elizabeth was at least somewhat familiar with Holinshed, as her 
counsellors certainly were. (Felicity Heal, ‘Readership and Reception’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Holinshed’s Chronicles, ed. by Paulina Kewes, Ian W. Archer, and Felicity Heal (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), pp. 355–74, (p. 361). 
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described herself as a mirror for princes in more complex terms, when in 1586 she 
wrote to James VI of Scotland to advise him against forming an alliance with France:  
Only natural affection [...] stirred me to save you from the murderers of your father 
and the peril that their complices might breed you. Thus, as in no counterfeit mirror 
you may behold without mask the faces of both beginners.52 
 
Here Elizabeth evokes the mirror both as a false counsellor, and at the same time as a 
true reflection of the world and a tool for self-reflection and self-knowledge. She posits 
herself and her counsel as a mirror in which James could see his political dilemma and 
the lords surrounding him in their true proportions, while simultaneously implying 
that the lords are ‘counterfeit mirrors’; counsellors that flattered a prince’s vanity and 
led him, and the realm, into peril. Likewise, in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, Cassius 
positions himself to Brutus as a true mirror that will show Brutus his own ‘hidden 
worthiness’, a plain-spoken friend, and therefore, a good counsellor.53  
Thus, we can see several image-schemata (in Lakoff’s terms) common to 
mirrors and to counsel, whether directly in letters or more broadly in literature: 
● A mirror reflects a situation as it is, without bias. 
● A mirror reflects everything there is to be seen of something. 
● A mirror reflects a situation only partially. 
                                                        
52 Queen Elizabeth to the King of Scotland, April 26, 1586. Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. 
the Marquis of Salisbury, Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire, ed. by E. Salisbury. Vol. 13: 12C-1597. 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1915), p. 293.  
<http://go.galegroup.com.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/mss/i.do?id=GALE|MC4306400897&v=2.1&u=u
nimelb&it=r&p=SPOL&sw=w&viewtype=Calendar> [accessed 24 October 2016]. 
53 BRUTUS: ‘The eye sees not itself/ But by reflection…’ CASSIUS: ‘... you have no such mirrors as will 
turn/ Your hidden worthiness into your eye… I your glass, Will modestly discover to yourself/ That 
of yourself which you yet know not of.’ Julius Caesar I. ii. 51–58, 66–70. Cited in Hunt, pp. 31–2. 
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● A mirror reflects the surface appearance of things, encouraging narcissism and 
ignorance. 
● A mirror reflects the person looking into it. 
● A mirror can be distorting. 
● A reflection is always inverted. 
 
All of these disparate resemblances were simultaneously consistent with, and indeed 
constitutive of, the topology of the mirror image-schema, and the domain of counsel. 
I suggest that this was possible by mapping the mirror onto a number of other image-
schemata and thence onto the image-schema of counsel (that is, of the giving and 
receiving of advice) through the practice of literary imitatio and collatio of metaphors.54 
Key to this process was the double tradition of the Pauline mirror and the mirror of 
Narcissus. Mather makes explicit reference to one such image-schema when he refers 
Elizabeth to her own ‘dread Sovereign’:  
 
your Majestie [...] being a Mirror of Clemencie, will, [...] deal herein, as it shall please 
God, the Director of Princes to inspire your Heighnes with his devine Grace and 
Goodnes.55 
                                                        
54 Thomas Elyot’s Boke Named the Governour (1531) is the primary source here. See also the discussions 
of Elizabethan counsel in, for example,F. W. Conrad, ‘The problem of counsel reconsidered: the case of 
Sir Thomas Elyot’, in Political Thought and the Tudor Commonwealth: Deep Structure, Discourse and 
Disguise, ed. By Paul Fideler and Thomas Mayer  (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 77–110; Allyna E. 
Ward, Women and Tudor Tragedy: Feminizing Counsel and Representing Gender (Madison and Teaneck: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2013), pp. 6–7, 38–43, 52–3; Greg Walker, Writing Under Tyranny: 
English Literature and the Henrician Reformation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Natalie Mears, 
Queenship and Political Discourse in the Elizabethan Realms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), pp. 95–101; and Peter Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp. 53–4. 
55 Mather’s Submission, 29 Jan. 1571. A Collection of State Papers... Left by William Cecill Lord Burghley, ed. 
by William Murdin. Vol. 2: 1571–1596. (London: William Bowyer, 1759), p. 207. 




In the chain of command of Elizabethan office, each person, including the monarch, 
was a mirror (reflection) of their superior, and a mirror (example) to their inferiors.56 
Through the influence and imitation of Aristotle, Neoplatonism, and medieval 
authorities such as St Bonaventure, the chain image-schema was blended with the 
Renaissance concept of vision: 
 
all of creation, including humankind, was thought of as so many specula, or mirrors, 
catching the rays of divine light/love as they stream from godhead and reflecting them 
downward to the creature beneath in a Great Chain of Being.57  
 
This chain of mirrors has obvious echoes in that of the Pauline mirror, in which light 
corresponds to wisdom. How this worked in the practice of Tudor counsel is shown 
in William Baldwin’s The Mirror for Magistrates, a collection of verse tragedies narrated 
by various unfortunates in English history, introduced by short prose links. The 
audience of ‘magistrates’, that is, any office-holders, are counselled to see themselves 
as deputies of God:  
 
                                                        
56 See Arthur O. Lovejoy, The great chain of being: a study of the history of an idea: the William James lectures 
delivered at Harvard University, 1933 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), and E. M. W. 
Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture (London: Chatto and Windus, 1943), noting that they focused on 
continuities between classical, medieval and Renaissance thought.  
57 Joseph Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Traditions in Dante’s “Comedy” (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1968), 
pp. 15–16, 20–21, quoted in Hunt, p. 23. 
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For as justice is the chief virtue, so is the ministration thereof, the chiefest office: and 
therefore hath God established it with the chiefest name, honoring and calling kings, 
and all officers under them, by his own name, Gods. Ye be all gods [...] 58   
 
As in the source texts, the tragic figures are also, for the most part, noble. The 
Mirror is intended to remind its readers of the right way to behave, particularly in 
offices of authority, and of the divine origin of individual responsibility. The choices 
of historical persons in each succeeding edition are cited as evidence of this didactic 
message.59 The individual tragedies for the most part are negative examples. Maurice 
Hunt suggests that the exemplary mirrors in the Mirror, or at least the kings that are 
mirrors (Richard II, James I, and Edward IV in the 1559 edition), are ‘warnings for 
readers (especially princely ones)’ because ‘their virtues are few, or nonexistent’.60 The 
metaphorical sense of ‘mirror’ as ‘negative example’ in political counsel persisted 
throughout Elizabeth’s reign, as when Sir Francis Walsingham, Elizabeth’s principal 
secretary, warned the Lord Chancellor of Scotland that the fate of: 
 
Don Antonio [King of Portugal] may serve for a lively example, wherein as a mirror 
he [Maitland] may behold his fortune falling into the like hard and distressed estate.61 
                                                        
58 Baldwin’s dedication to the 1559 edition in William Baldwin, The mirror for magistrates, edited from 
original texts in the Huntington library, ed. by Lily B. Campbell (Cambridge: The University Press, 1938), 
p. 65. 
59 See Paul Budra, ‘A Mirror for Magistrates’ and the ‘de casibus’ tradition (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2000), pp. 25–30. 
60 Hunt, p. 87. 
61 Walsingham to [the Chancellor of Scotland], March 1587. Cotton Caligula D/I f.133. Don Antonio 
was at the time in exile and attempting to garner support from England against Spain, however he ‘was 
in despair of the Queen’s giving him help to undertake any enterprise himself, and was almost 
starving.’ Bernardino De Mendoza to King Philip of Spain, 26th March 1587 <http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/simancas/vol4/pp43-59> (no. 48) [accessed 10 November 2016]. There 




The same meaning occurs in a letter to Walsingham dated five years before, which 
shows the process Wilson described: ‘time and practice’ made ‘words borrowed’ ‘the 
rather used’.62  
Grabes classifies the Mirror for Magistrates as an admonitory mirror and it 
appears Baldwin intended it as such.63 In the introduction, Baldwin’s ‘chiefest ende’ 
was that the reader: 
 
[...] here as in a loking glas, [...] shall see (if any vice be in you) howe the like hath bene 
punished in other heretofore, whereby admonished, I trust it will [...] move you to the 
soner amendement.64 
 
This illustrates an extra dimension to the metaphor. In Lakoff’s terms, the chain 
image-schema is topologically consistent with the reflection image-schema. This 
combination allows each link in the chain of mirrors, that is, each reader, to be both 
positive and negative examples. This is evidenced in Duke Humfrey’s exhortation to 
the reader in the Mirror for Magistrates: ‘Note well the cause of my decay and fall, / 
And make a mirror for magistrates all’.65 This ‘decay and fall’ is a negative example 
with the reader urged to become a positive mirror, in the sense that Elizabeth was 
asked to be a mirror of clemency.  
                                                        
was a plot at the time to murder Don Antonio by poisoning his fortnightly enema: indeed, a hard and 
distressed estate. 
62 The abuses of Catholic armies are presented ‘for a mirror [to the people of Flanders] not [to] let 
themselves be led over a precipice[…].’ Rossel to Walsingham, Feb 4 1582. SP 83/15 f. 19. 
63 Grabes, p. 82. 
64 Baldwin, ed. Campbell, pp. 65–7. 
65 Baldwin, ed. Campbell, p. 445. 
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The chain image-schema also allows for simultaneous notions of counsel, as 
both a false and true mirror. The reader could see, as in a (true) reflection, the negative 
consequences of being deceived by Narcissan mirrors of false counsellors: ‘Whereby 
the world may see, as in a glass, The unsure state, of them that stand most high, Which 
than dread least, when danger is most nigh’.66  They also saw the consequences of 
being such a mirror:  
 
Where Judges and Justices may see, as in a glasse, 
What fee is for falshode, and what our wages was  
Who for our princes pleasure corrupt with meed and awe  
wittyngly and wretchedly did wrest the sence of lawe.67 
 
As Edmund Spenser reminded Elizabeth in The Faerie Queene:  
 
[...] true curtesie,  
Its now so farre from that, which then it was, 
That it indeed is nought but forgerie,  
Fashion’d to please the eies of them, that pas, 
Which see not perfect things but in a glas: 
Yet is that glasse so gay that it can blynd/ The wisest sight [...]68 
 
                                                        
66 Baldwin, ed. Campbell, p. 459. 
67 Baldwin, ed. Campbell, p. 73. 
68 Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, Book Six and the Mutabilitie Cantos, ed. by Andrew Hadfield and 
Abraham Stoll (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007), p. 4. 
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Thus, the Pauline mirror, through which we see ‘through a glass darkly’, was usefully 
combined with the annihilating vanity of Narcissus. While explicitly addressing an 
audience of noble individuals, the Mirror is also positioned as a conduct mirror for the 
nation more broadly. The poems in the Mirror for Magistrates are referred to as 
tragedies and their sources are chronicles, thus mapping the mirror onto two 
established genres in the domain of history. National and/or world history was one 
of the most popular forms of the encyclopedic mirror. Of the three parts of the much-
reprinted medieval Speculum Maius, which described the nature, doctrine, and history 
of the world, the Speculum Historiale was the most popular. In England, William 
Caxton’s Mirror of the World (1481 and 1490) and John Swan’s Speculum mundi, which 
went through four editions by 1670, were equally popular translations of chronicles. 
John Lydgate’s 1430s Fall of Princes proceeded chronologically from Adam and Eve to 
the Battle of Poitiers (1356). The Mirror for Magistrates was printed as an 
accompaniment to a new edition of Lydgate, continuing Lydgate’s chronicle ‘since the 
tyme of kyng Richard the seconde’.69 Subsequent editions added later individuals as 
well as more English historical figures.  Each successive edition also left out particular 
figures.70 It is clear, however, that the chronicle form remained, in the sense of a 
comprehensive history of the nation from Adam and Eve to the time of publication.  
The Mirror for Magistrates draws explicitly on chronicles, and on De Casibus 
tragedy; that is the fall of the great, either as divine punishment for hubris or just 
                                                        
69 According to the title of the first edition: Baldwin, William, ca. 1518–1563, A memorial of suche princes, 
as since the tyme of king Richard the seconde, haue been vnfortunate in the realme of England, (London: In 
ædibus Iohannis Waylandi, cum priuilegio per septenniam, 1554?). 
70 The principal editions (1559, 1563, 74, 78, 87, 1610) are surveyed in Lily Campbell’s ‘Introduction’, 
pp. 5–19. 
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through the fickleness of fortune (or indeed, as divine punishment for having too 
much faith in fortune).71 As well as extending the admonitory mirror into chronicle 
form, the Mirror also constitutes a larger tragedy of ‘mundane irrationality’; that is, of 
the inescapable absurdity of the world.72 Its models, Lydgate’s Fall of Princes (c. 1431–
9) and Boccaccio’s De Casibus Virorum Illustrium (On the Fates or Misfortunes of Famous 
Men, c. 1358) were collections of tragic biographies that showed in microcosm the 
postlapsarian trajectory of the human condition: ‘the instability of fortune; and […] 
the certain death of men’.73 It is not surprising, then, that literary critics, and to a lesser 
extent historians, have seen the element of tragedy in the Mirror for Magistrates as 
reinforcing the notion of obedience to orthodoxy. 
The multiplicity and intersectionality of different linguistic modes in English 
history and their effect on shaping English identity is a major theme of recent 
scholarship. Catherine Nicholson suggests that early sixteenth-century English 
authors’ sense of nationhood depended on a sense of balance between resemblance 
and strangeness learned from their studies of rhetoric: 
 
                                                        
71 Notably Edward Hall’s The Union of the Two Noble and Illustre Families of Lancastre and Yorke ..., 
commonly known as Hall's Chronicle, first published in 1548 (London: In officina Richardi Graftoni 
typis impress., 1548. STC (2nd ed.) / 12722), and Robert Fabyan, The new chronicles of England and France, 
in two parts, by Robert Fabyan. Named by himself The concordance of histories, first published 1516 (London: 
Richard Pynson, 1516. STC (2nd ed.) / 10659). Both works were among the best known of the mid-
sixteenth century. 
72 Grabes, pp. 172–3. 
73 Giovanni Boccaccio, The Fates of Illustrious Men, ed. and trans. by Louis Brewer Hall (New York: 
Frederick Ungar 1965), p. 4. Quoted in Budra, p. 18. ‘The fall of nobles, with eueri circumstaunce, / 
From ther lordshippes, dreedful and vnstable,... Therin to shewe Fortunys variaunce, / That othre 
myhte as in a merour see / In worldly worshepe may be no surete.’ Lydgate, Fall of Princes, ed. by 
Henry Bergen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924–1927), Book 1 verse 8 
<http://xtf.lib.virginia.edu/xtf/view?docId=chadwyck_ep/uvaGenText/tei/chep_1.0297.xml;chunk
.id=d3;toc.depth=1;toc.id=d3;brand=default> [accessed 24 October 2016]. 
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even as [English authors’] study of ancient rhetoric and poetry taught them to 
recognise their estrangement from antiquity, it also taught them to perceive in that 
estrangement — or any estrangement of language — the essence of literary value.74 
 
Without the cultivation of a certain degree of alienation — without translation and 
metaphor — eloquence collapses into mere talk; taken too far, the exoticism of 
eloquence becomes affectation and absurdity.75 
 
As noted earlier, Peacham and Puttenham speak of metaphor in exactly these terms, 
a translation: 
 
[...] from the proper signification, to another not proper, but yet nigh and like.76   
 
a kind of wresting [...] from his owne right signification, to another not so naturall, but 
yet of some affinitie or conueniencie with it.77  
 
That is to say, for sixteenth-century authors, their sense of ‘self and other’ was 
predicated on how they understood metaphor.  
Borrowing genre conventions from the established historical forms of chronicle 
and tragedy lends the Mirror the authority and scale of history. Similarly, explicitly 
calling the text a mirror maps other established meanings of the mirror, performance, 
                                                        
74 Catherine Nicholson, Uncommon Tongues: Eloquence and Eccentricity in the English Renaissance 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 11. 
75 Nicholson, p. 14. 
76 Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (1593). 
77 Puttenham, Arte of English Poesie, 3.17. 
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true and false counsel, positive and negative example, on to the domain of national 
history. 
While the Mirror for Magistrates is a cornerstone of the history of sovereignty 
and of literary history, particularly the history of drama, the change in title has rarely 
been discussed. In the first edition, which appeared in 1554 or 1555, but was 
suppressed, the title was A Memorial of Suche Princes, as [...] have been unfortunate in the 
Realme of England. Only the title page and one leaf of this edition survive. A Memorial 
did not appear until after the end of Mary I’s reign in 1559, with a new title: A Myrrour 
for Magistrates, wherein may be seen by example of other, with howe grievous plages vices are 
punished and howe frayle and unstable worldly prosperity is found, even of those, whom 
Fortune seemeth most highly to favour. The prefatory material explicitly called it a mirror 
while it was still titled A Memorial. Whether or not the preface was rewritten between 
A Memorial and A Mirror, the new title did place the emphasis on the text as a form of 
mirror. Whereas a memorial is a static image-schema, a mirror is dynamic, interactive. 
Bart van Es argues that ‘Historical collections such as the [...] Mirror for Magistrates 
were “mirrors” precisely because the message they bore changed in relation to their 
reader’,78 and that ‘it was this continual effort of updating’, this capacity to reflect the 
reader’s political reality at whatever time it was read ‘that gave the endless mirror 
expansions and collections their long lives.’79  
                                                        
78 Bart van Es, Spenser's Forms of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 145.  
79 Bart van Es, ‘’They do it with Mirrors’: Baldwin’s Mirror and Elizabethan Literature’s Political 
Vanishing Act’, in ‘A Mirror for Magistrates’ in Context: Literature, History and Politics in Early Modern 
England, ed. by Harriet Archer and Andrew Hadfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 
pp. 216–30 (p. 218). 
Ceræ: An Australasian Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 4 (2017) 
24 
 
Once established, genres can be combined in various ways, mapping 
conventions from one genre on to another: as we have seen in the Mirror for 
Magistrates’ combination of speculum principis, tragedy, and national history. As with 
conceptual metaphors, the very establishment of genres prompts readers to question 
and complicate them. Much as Lakoff said of conceptual metaphors, 
 
Genres order and transmit history, but they can also alter the perception of real events 
or produce dissonance, especially where they disrupt expectations or compete with 
adjacent forms for interpretive authority (my emphasis).80  
 
The emphasis on Fortune’s fickleness in chronicles, when combined with the 
chronicle-as-mirror, lends itself not only to the tragedy of ‘mundane irrationality’ as 
noted by Grabes and Budra, but also to the exploration of ideas of deliberate false 
counsel and of performance.81 Recent scholarship has questioned earlier criticism of 
the Mirror for Magistrates as a simplistic admonitory mirror reinforcing obedience to 
either Marian or Elizabethan orthodoxy, seeing in it both ‘a conversation about power’ 
and a conscious performance. 82 Baldwin was an experienced printer and publisher. 
As editor, the choice of the new title may well have been his: but whether or not he 
chose it, it is likely that it was chosen advisedly. It was a dangerous time to be a 
Protestant printer, writer, and preacher, but Baldwin was good at adapting to the fast-
                                                        
80 Tricia A. McElroy, ‘Genres’, in The Oxford Handbook of Holinshed’s Chronicles, ed. by Kewes, Archer 
and Heal, pp. 267–83, (p. 269).  
81 Alexandra Walsham, ‘Providentialism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Holinshed’s Chronicles, ed. by 
Kewes, Archer and Heal, pp. 427–42, (p. 432). 
82 Jessica Winston, ‘A Mirror for Magistrates and Public Political Discourse in Elizabethan England’, 
Studies in Philology, 101 (2004), 381–400 (p. 382). Scott C. Lucas, A Mirror for Magistrates and the Politics 
of the English Reformation (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009), pp. 39, 203. 
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changing circumstances, for example, working for the same publisher under 
Protestant and then Catholic management. He was also a shrewd artist: ‘Even before 
A Mirror he had experimented with multiple frames for his texts and the interplay 
among authors’ and printer’s perspectives’.83 The prose links in the Mirror for 
Magistrates display the pragmatic circumstances of the text’s composition. The printer, 
Wayland, asked Baldwin to coordinate the work and Baldwin, somewhat unwillingly, 
agreed, finding seven fairly prominent contemporary authors to compose the 
tragedies. The work was done collaboratively, and historical figures appear in dreams 
to the group of assembled authors to ‘make their moan’ in the first person.84 Whether 
these circumstances are fictionalised or not is less important than the verisimilitude 
on display. The Mirror is a frame within a frame within a frame. It exploits the 
elements of ‘counterfeit’ and ‘reversal’ that the mirror image-schema shared with the 
dream vision and false encomium, genre conventions common in satires such as the 
medieval Piers Plowman or Alexander Barclay’s 1509 Ship of Fooles. Grabes sees the 
Mirror for Magistrates as satire in the de contemptu mundi tradition of the Ship of Fooles, 
because of its emphasis on tragedy and the fickleness of Fortune.85  
However, for the authors and printers of the Mirror, satire was a fundamentally 
worldly imperative, as the poet Collingbourne states in the Mirror: ‘I am that 
Collingbourne / Which rhymed that which made full many mourn: / The Cat, the 
                                                        
83 Skura, p. 75. 
84
 As invited by Baldwin (Baldwin, ed. by Campbell, p. 69), and as described in the complaints of Sir 
Roger Mortimer (Baldwin, ed. by Campbell, p. 81), and Richard Chaloner (p. 111). 
85 Grabes, p. 90. 
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Rat, and Lovel our Dog, Do rule all England, under a Hog.’86 The poet was put to 
death for this rhyme, but posthumously pleads his loyalty:  
 
For where I meant the king by name of Hog,  
I only alluded to his badge the boar:  
To Lovels name I added more our dog,  
because most dogs have borne that name of yore.  
These metaphors I use with other more, As Cat, and Rat, the half names of the rest, 
To hide the sense which they so wrongly wrest.87 (my emphasis) 
 
As hinted by the conflation of metaphor and catachresis in the work of Peacham, 
Puttenham and Day, such ‘wresting’88 from the ‘proper’ or ‘right signification’89 was 
‘necessary abuse’.90 Collingbourne argues that his metaphors were closer to the ‘right’ 
or literal meaning of the boar, the dog, cat, and rat, than to the ‘further’ pejorative 
meanings of these animals which his readers found (and executed him for). ‘Satire, 
like tragedy, is a way of taking seriously man’s condition’, a constructed realm for 
negotiating between ideals and expedients.91 In the case of the court poet 
Collingbourne, the satirical mirror is negotiating between the ideals and the 
expedients of several of the king’s subjects: Lydgate, Boccaccio, and the chroniclers, 
who were no strangers to the vagaries of patronage and fortune; the nobility ‘and all 
                                                        
86 Baldwin, ed. by Campbell, p. 349. 
87 Baldwin, ed. by Campbell, p. 357. 
88 Puttenham, Arte of English Poesie, 3.17. 
89 Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (1593); Puttenham, Arte of English Poesie, 3.17. 
90 Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (London: H. Jackson, 1577), STC / 348:04, sig. C4r. 
91 Ellen Leyburn, Satiric Allegory: Mirror of Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), p. 137. 
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other in office’; and finally, authors and poets in general. As Ellen Leyburn noted: ‘The 
appropriation of the same figure of the mirror by both satire and metaphor, with the 
implied extension to allegory, indicates a fundamental affinity in the need for indirect 
communication’.92 
This need did not disappear with the succession of Queen Elizabeth. The Mirror 
was reissued eight times, the last in 1620.93 It was a popular work referred to by Ben 
Jonson and Shakespeare, and the title was frequently copied in the late sixteenth 
century: Grabes notes an explosion of mirror titles after the publication of this text.94 
The mirror and the multiplicity of meanings it was accruing in this text and its 
‘progeny’, through the contemporary emphasis on imitatio and comparison and the 
prominence of metaphor in rhetorical education, created a space for cumulative 
image-schemata.95 At the same time, the Aristotelian idea of ‘sweet strangeness’ and 
subsequent conflation of catachresis and metaphor in rhetoric, kept the emphasis on 
difference and contrast between image-schemata. This in turn enabled the indirect 
communication that was so necessary for sixteenth-century writers, not just in literary 
creativity, but at the intersection of literature and the practice of counsel, as many of 
them were. 
In 1572, the courtier George Gascoigne was refused admission to Parliament 
on the grounds that he was ‘a common rhymer, a notorious ruffian, an atheist, and a 
                                                        
92 Leyburn, p. 9. 
93 The first part of the mirror for magistrates (1574), The seconde part (1578), The mirrour of Mutabilitie, or 
Principall part of the Mirrour for Magistrates (1579), 1587, A Mirror for Magistrates… Newly enlarged, with 
… a Poem annexed, called Englands Eliza (1610), The Falls of Vnfortvnate Princes (1620). 
94 Louis R. Zocca, Elizabethan Narrative Poetry (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1950), p. 23, 
quoted in Grabes, p. 32. 
95 Willard Farnham, The Medieval Heritage of Elizabethan Tragedy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970), p. 304. 
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godless person.’96 In 1576 Gascoigne published The Steele Glas, a verse satire on 
contemporary society that contrasted the old-fashioned steel mirrors with the new 
cristallo glass mirrors exported from Venice. Like Elizabeth, Gascoigne evokes the 
tropes of ‘true’ and flattering mirrors. Unlike the cristallo mirrors then dominating the 
English luxury market, which merely enabled vanity, his steel glass was made of 
tougher stuff, and the constant effort and polishing (that is, reading and thinking) 
required provided a truer reflection of the reader’s soul.97 In this, Gascoigne made use 
of the long established metaphor of the Pauline mirror, all the more valuable the more 
oblique it was: ‘For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I 
know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known’.98 Obscurity, then, was 
not only narcissist artifice — though it was also that — but also had a Pauline mystical 
function. Mirrors were a means to vanity, to self-understanding, and also to spiritual 
development. 
Gascoigne’s literary mirrors succeeded in gaining him patronage and 
diplomatic work. His masque in 1575 at Kenilworth drew Elizabeth’s approval, as did 
his didactic play The Glasse of Government.99 In August 1576 he was sent to the Low 
Countries to report on affairs directly to William Cecil, Lord Burghley, the Lord High 
Treasurer. Walsingham and others of Elizabeth’s councillors also read Gascoigne’s 
reports, and his literary style passed into standard rhetorical textbooks: Puttenham 
                                                        
96 ‘Certain objections why George Gascoigne…’, 1572, SP 12/86 f.235. In Calendar of State Papers, 
Domestic Series, of the Reigns of Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, 1547–1580, ed. by R. Lemon. (London: 
Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts, 1856), p. 444. 
97 Kalas, pp. 107–10. 
98 1 Corinthians 13:12. Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, Bk XV. 
99 Gillian Austen, George Gascoigne (Cambridge: Brewer, 2008), p. 172. 
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quotes him in the Arte of English Poesie.100 The Queen’s cousin also understood the 
spiritual value of mirrors in the same way as Gascoigne. In a 1578 letter to her priest, 
Mary Queen of Scots describes the priest’s letters ‘as a mirror or picture to represent 
to me daily [...] both the defect of my actions and the grace required for the 
accomplishment’ of her royal duties.101 For Mary, as for Elizabeth and for Gascoigne, 
the mirror of counsel was both an object of ideal and inversion, showing the audience 
what they should, and what they should not, be, as well as reflecting who they so 
imperfectly were.  
The same applied to the stage. In 1579 Stephen Gosson, ex-playwright, 
published the Schoole of Abuse, in which he acknowledges the stage as a flattering 
mirror, in the same way as Gascoigne’s crystal glass or Elizabeth’s counterfeit mirror. 
Plays are ruinous to society, he wrote, not just a mirror of vice but a ‘school of abuse’. 
And yet, plays can also teach virtue, representing to society a clear picture of their 
ideals and in Mary’s words ‘the defect of [their] actions’. Whereas ancient Roman and 
contemporary Continental theatre was a notorious hotbed of flattery and 
licentiousness, explained Gosson in enthusiastic detail, ‘Nowe are the abuses of the 
worlde reuealed, euery man in a play may see his owne faultes, and learne by this 
glasse, to amende his manners’.102 Thus, the stories enacted on the Elizabethan stage 
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8. George Gascoigne, A Hundreth Sundrie Flowres, ed. by G. W. Pigman III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
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were understood, or at least advertised, to function in the same ways as the 
biographies in the Mirror for Magistrates. The connection between history and 
performance was often direct: it has been argued that ‘Holinshed’s Chronicles gave rise 
to more plays than any other work, old or new, in the early modern period’.103 Social 
mirrors like The Steele Glas and The Schoole of Abuse are generally considered 
satirical,104 as mirrors for princes could also be.105 In a mirror for princes, satire was 
intended to develop a prince’s sovereignty over both his personal weaknesses and 
over the realm. The Steele Glas and the Schoole of Abuse suggest that literary mirrors 
functioned for society in the same way. Thus, mirrors in counsel could be 
encyclopaedic, reflecting society as it was; didactic, showing what the audience 
should, or should not, be; fantastic, showing things that did not exist; and prophetic. 
That they could be all of these at the same time suggests that these metaphorical 
meanings cohered.  
Discussing the then prominent role of satire at the time Hamlet was written, 
Maurice A. Hunt complicates Grabes’ acceptance of drama as a mirror of nature:  
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Through Hamlet’s satire, Shakespeare implies that a literal mirror must replace the 
mirror of drama when an age’s diction, the language that makes up the dialogue of 
drama, is so artificial that it cannot reliably perform language’s role in making drama 
reflect “the form and pressure of the age” without results beneficial to theatre-goers.106 
 
This passage highlights the importance of language and drama to Elizabethans as 
mirrors, but as appropriate mirrors of ‘the form and pressure of the age’ with ‘results 
beneficial to theatre-goers.’ Rayna Kalas has suggested that English Protestant writers 
had to be particularly careful of the material and potentially idolatrous nature of 
language.107 The established metaphor of the Pauline mirror simultaneously 
reinforced the idea of the mind as a false mirror, which distorts what it shows, as 
Francis Bacon formulated it in Novum Organum, and as a true mirror of its divine 
creator.108 Ironically, the plethora of images and image-schemata available for the 
mirror metaphor allowed writers to make a case for the truth, and the falsehood, of 
their counsel at the same time. Such mirrors of ‘mundane irrationality’ seem far less 
irrational from this point of view.109  
They were not necessarily mundane either.110 A 1518 letter from Erasmus 
throws another, less worldly, light on the subject, showing the mirror as a conceptual 
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metaphor for spiritual as well as literary imitatio. The letter is to Conradus Mutianus 
Rufus, a graduate of the University of Erfurt and at the time a canon of Gotha after 
having studied in Italy.111 It is a short thank-you note both for a letter from Mutianus, 
‘the mirror of its fair-minded writer’, and for a recent visit by Helius Eobanus, another 
Erfurt alumnus, who had brought letters from members of their circle and some 
writing of his own. The reference to Mutianus’ letter as ‘the mirror of its writer’ here 
evokes a Renaissance commonplace, derived from Socrates; that of language as the 
mirror of the soul. In light of this, Erasmus’ praise of Eobanus’ poetry is telling. He 
shows ‘an original vein of talent [...] you would think him a poet born, not made by 
practice. He has the same gifts in prose [...]’.112 Despite Erasmus’ copious exposition 
of how style is made by imitating the best authors for example, ‘I think of him as Ovid 
reincarnate’, this also reflects another aspect of the metaphor of language as a 
(Pauline) mirror, with lower forms reflecting the light of higher forms in the Great 
Chain of Being.113 Language is the mirror, the means of reflection, but also the light 
reflected by the mirror. This apparent violation of the invariance hypothesis clarifies 
the relationship of stylistic talent and practice in Erasmian imitatio. Erasmus praises 
his friend as: 
 
uniting in [yourself] all I had previously loved or admired in others separately [...] 
your great gifts [...] you owe partly to hard work and partly to heaven [...].114  
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114 Erasmus to Helius Eobanus Hessus, Ep. 874, in The Correspondence of Erasmus, p. 142. 




This passage is a neat encapsulation of the prevailing view of metaphor and linguistic 
meaning in the sixteenth century: an innate human capacity and indeed a divinely 
inspired imperative to give clarity and ‘splendour’ to their world through linguistic 
innovation, and the conviction that this originality could best be achieved by close 
reading, comparing and internalising the styles of a wide variety of models.115 
For Elizabeth and her courtiers, Mary, the writers and readers of the Mirror for 
Magistrates, Gascoigne, Gosson, playwrights and playgoers, and Erasmus, abuse was 
therefore necessary politically, creatively, historically, and spiritually. Certain 
resemblances between established image-schemata were repeatedly stressed and 
embroidered upon, others less so. The mirror metaphor and its many current 
meanings in sixteenth-century counsel is an example of how the source domain, the 
‘prevailing meaning’, shaped the target domain through cumulative image-schemata, 
giving rise to new domains of meaning while — and because — they preserved the 
old meanings. The search for sweetness and strangeness, and the habit of comparison 
and collatio, both cemented conceptual metaphors and exploded them. This sense of 
‘the proper and natural meaning’ as a background, foundation, or parent of new 
meanings by way of imitatio, allowed for a Renaissance theory of metaphor, and 
arguably of cognition, as cumulative. Lakoff and Johnson’s invariance principle also 
shows a cumulative understanding of metaphor and cognition, however, it could be 
argued that the sixteenth-century practice of imitatio regularly violated the invariance 
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principle, failing to ‘preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema 
structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the 
target domain’. The same mirror, and the same counsel, could be a tool for self-
knowledge and for self-deception. 
As Mark Turner hypothesised: 
 
There is a system to imagination. Although infinitely variable and unpredictable, 
imagination is grounded in structures of invention either wholly unoriginal or with an 
originality that consists of exploitations within a known and unoriginal space. Were 
imagination free, we would take its products as unintelligible, meritless caprices rather 
than as significant, valuable achievements. Metaphoric imagination, including [...] in 
those poems we regard as most original, suggestive, and demanding, appears to be 
guided and made meaningful by an utterly unoriginal constraint so unrecognized in 
criticism and so daunting in its complexity that it cannot even be formulated, but must 
be gestured toward, with a heavy reliance upon the reader’s intuitive sense of what it 
means: the image-schematic structure of the target is not to be violated.116 
 
As we have seen, sixteenth-century rhetoricians conceived of imitatio not as a 
constraint, but as a system: a system of such robustness and complexity that it allowed 
for the image-structure of the target domains of its metaphors to be violated 
deliberately, and often. These violations of Lakoff’s invariance principle formed some 
of the literature ‘we regard as most original, suggestive, and demanding’. They also 
formed a cumulative array of conceptual frameworks that shaped both early modern 
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and contemporary experiences of phenomena as universal and abstract as counsel, 



















This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported 
License. 
Any images contained within this article that are reproduced with permission are specifically excluded 
from the Creative Commons License. They may not be reproduced under any circumstances without 
the express written permission of the copyright holders. 
 
